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1 Introduction
For some years now, world economic activity and real interest rates have been chronically
low, a situation that motivated Summers (2013) to raise the issue of whether the global
economy may have entered a ‘secular stagnation,’ echoing Hansen (1938). In a world in secular
stagnation, output is depressed because, due to a combination of adverse demographics,
low productivity growth and economic frictions, global saving cannot be absorbed at full
employment. This hypothesis is by no means unchallenged. Notably, Lo and Rogoff (2015)
among others attribute the current protracted slowdown to the need for deleveraging after
the build-up of private and public debt before and in the aftermath of the global crisis.
Whatever its root causes, the crisis has made policymakers increasingly aware of the extent
to which national economies are alarmingly exposed to adverse global economic and financial
developments. After three decades of trade and financial globalization, for a typical market
economy, exports are a large component of demand, and its interest rates and asset prices are
highly correlated with those in world markets.
The question we address in this paper is whether and by which mechanism a small open
economy—heavily exposed to world variables but too small to affect them—can attain and
maintain full employment and price stability when world demand is chronically depressed
and global saving chronically excessive. While the crisis still weighs on global economic
activity, indeed, a number of small open economies have been able to maintain a high level of
domestic employment and positive growth rates. Classical open macro theory suggests that
a single country can insulate its macroeconomy from adverse external conditions by letting
its exchange rate absorb the contraction in world demand, and improve its external surplus.
In Table 1, we provide evidence based on a large panel of countries for the period 1980-2011.
In the Table, we regress measures of domestic economic activity on net foreign assets and
the terms of trade, and their interaction with global output (details are reported in the notes
of the Table 1). The interaction terms are significant and negative: in a global downturn,
unemployment is systematically lower in countries with positive net foreign asset positions
and weaker real exchange rates. While these correlations are consistent with a wide range of
models, they provide a specific empirical motivation to our study.
In our study, we are specifically interested in understanding how a central bank can engineer
an escape from deflation and unemployment in a world of secular stagnation. Our point of
departure are the open economy overlapping generations models by Eggertsson et al. (2016)
(henceforth EMSS) and Caballero et al. (2015) (henceforth CFG). We modify EMSS to analyse
a small open economy that produces a differentiated good. This enables us to analyse the
real exchange rate and its attendant welfare and positive implications, while abstracting from
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the question of policy spillbacks.
We have two main findings. First, we show that, under plausible conditions on trade elastic-
ities, a small open economy in a world of chronically deficient demand can embark on a path
to full employment. The endpoint is characterised by a weaker real exchange rate, a trend
depreciation in the nominal exchange rate, inflation at target and, for standard parameter
values, a positive external asset position. With strong valuation and income effects, however,
the short-term dynamics of the escape from secular stagnation can exhibit exchange rate
overshooting, whereby upfront depreciation is followed by temporary appreciation, causing
the nominal interest rates to remain temporarily stuck at the zero lower bound. Most im-
portantly, the escape policy may be beggar thyself, raising employment but actually lowering
welfare.
Our second main result is that so long as the economy remains in a secular stagnation,
cutting the interest rate by relaxing the Effective Lower Bound (henceforth ELB) works as
a means of raising employment and inflation when the economy is financially closed. But
it can have exactly the opposite effect when the economy is financially open. The kernel of
the intuition is simply that, in an economy open to trade in assets, the terminal real interest
rate is pinned down at the global level by uncovered interest parity, so that lower nominal
rates must eventually translate into lower inflation, a trend exchange rate appreciation, and
thereby a more negative output gap. Nonetheless, should the ELB bind along the escape
path, relaxing it can help to ease and shorten the transition to full employment.
In accounts of secular stagnation such as EMSS and CFG, output is depressed because of a
shortage of stores of value, which are insufficient to absorb the volume of desired savings at
full employment at real interest rates attainable in a monetary economy subject to the ELB.
In this case, output must fall to restore equilibrium in the asset market. In an open economy,
the shortage of assets is global, and the distribution of output depends on who owns these
scarce stores of value.
We develop the framework of EMSS, introducing a differentiated domestic good to provide
an account of the real exchange rate, and the role of substitution and income effects shaping
the transitional dynamic to a full-employment steady state. Domestic real depreciation raises
world demand to absorb the country’s output on its path to full employment—a substitution
effect. But there is also an income effect, in that the lower price of domestic output reduces
domestic purchasing power, other things equal. When domestic and foreign goods are suffi-
ciently substitutable, the equilibrium fall in prices and hence the income effect are small, and
the rise in the volume of domestic output also raises domestic purchasing power. In this case,
domestic households must acquire foreign assets in order to absorb the increased savings that
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result from full employment.
In contrast, when domestic and foreign goods are poor substitutes, the price of home goods
must fall a great deal in response to their increased abundance. This fall in price outweighs
the increase in volume, leaving domestic households poorer notwithstanding the increase in
their employment. The value of domestic savings also falls. Depending on how the supply of
domestic assets is specified, domestic savings needs may be satisfied at home, and fewer or
even no foreign assets are acquired during the transition. The escape hence creates an adverse
trade-off—agents work more but consume less—which raises the possibility of welfare losses.
Currency wars, in this context, can be beggar thyself, rather than beggar thy neighbors.1 In the
empirically-relevant case of low short-run, high long-run trade elasticities, we show that the
path to full employment involves a ‘jam-tomorrow’ policy, sacrificing the welfare of current
generations for the sake of future ones.
Along the adjustment path, the path of policy and endogenous variables can look very different
to the standard prescriptions for dealing with underemployment in open economies, which
counsel cutting nominal interest rates or otherwise loosening monetary conditions. Depending
on the characteristics of the economy the dynamics can be very rich. The real exchange rate
may overshoot its weaker long run level. The nominal interest rate may rise immediately,
or can remain at the ELB before rising to its positive long run level. The real interest rate
generally rises to crowd out domestic expenditure before asymptoting back towards the world
level.
With a long-run tradeoff between output and inflation, inflation returns to target as the
economy converges towards full employment and so, as in EMSS, the nominal exchange must
steadily depreciate to keep international relative prices in check, given the conditions of de-
pression and deflation elsewhere in the world. In this sense, the policy prescription is both
‘neo-Fisherian’ (see Cochrane (2011)), involving higher nominal interest rates from the outset,
and an instance of the Svensson’s ‘Foolproof Method’ of achieving macroeconomic balance
in a small open economy through a trend nominal exchange rate depreciation, see Svensson
(2001) and Svensson (2003). Neither policy is sufficient in a financially closed economy, how-
ever, because the economy generally requires foreign inflows or outflows to equilibrate the
asset market at full employment.
A number of central banks have recently attempted to counter low inflation and/or lacklustre
growth by reducing nominal interest rates to unprecedentedly low levels (Danmarks Nation-
albank (DN), the European Central Bank (ECB), Sveriges Riksbank and the Swiss National
1Welfare assessment crucially depends on the disutility from involuntary unemployment, a point recently
stressed by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2015). For an analysis of beggar thyself depreciation in open economy
macro see Corsetti and Pesenti (2001)
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Bank (SNB) cut interest rates to below zero during the period from mid-2014 to early 2015,
and most recently the Bank of Japan (BoJ) (see Bech and Malkhozov (2016)) and BoE2
applied similar policies). In a financially closed economy, a sufficiently large reduction in the
ELB on nominal interest rates can indeed restore full employment: nominal interest must fall
to a level consistent with both the inflation target and the market-clearing real interest rate.
But in an economy open to trade in assets, the real interest rate is pinned down at the world
level. So by the Fisher equality, a permanent cut in nominal interest rates must eventually
reduce inflation. Given the long-run tradeoff between output and prices in EMSS, this implies
a lower future level of output, raising the real exchange rate today and causing output to fall
immediately. This is not to say that ELB policies are necessarily counterproductive: if the
economy is already on the escape route, we show that cutting interest rates can help smooth
this adjustment path.
There are two points worth highlighting. Firstly, in line with the recent literature reviving
secular stagnation, our paper focuses on the case where the world is permanently in a liquidity
trap with negative neutral rates. Secondly, as we study on a small open economy, we do not
discuss the cross-border spillovers that may stem from different domestic adjustment paths —
amply discussed by the Eggertsson et al. (2015) and Caballero et al. (2016). By no means do
we mean to downplay the issue. In particular, if a sufficient number of small open economies
pursue the escape path depreciating their currencies, their joint behaviour is bound to have
a first-order effect on the world real interest rates and allocation. In this case, domestic
policymakers might need to focus on domestic stimulus rather than relying solely on the
exchange rate channel, while support from other policies, including structural policies and
asset-supply policies, might be necessary to lift global neutral rates. It is precisely because
each small country has a strong incentive to pursue an individual escape path from stagnation
that international policy coordination may be required.
Finally, our analysis naturally relates to contributions that study open economies in a tem-
porary liquidity trap, either using a two-country model, see Cook and Devereux (2013), or
taking the perspective of a small open economy, see Corsetti et al. (2016). As in our contri-
bution, also in these frameworks exchange rate adjustment is key to moderate the negative
implications of a global liquidity trap for the domestic economy. In particular, the nomi-
nal exchange rate needs to depreciate persistently to allow domestic inflation to rise above
the world deflationary drift. Different from our analysis, however, in these frameworks ELB
policies are generally desirable.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the two-country mode
2Monetary Policy Summary, 4 August 2016, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/Documents
/mpc/mps/2016/mpsaug.pdf
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Table 1: Partial correlation between net foreign assets, terms of trade and domestic
output gap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES y-gap y-gap u-gap neg u-gap neg
NFA/Y 0.040 0.107 0.292*** -0.020
[0.15] [0.15] [0.10] [0.11]
Terms of Trade 8.731*** 9.852*** 2.045* 0.051
[2.26] [2.25] [1.21] [1.22]
NFA * mean(y-gap) -0.136**
[0.06]
Terms of Trade * mean(y-gap) -4.374***
[0.82]
NA * mean(u-gap neg) -0.490***
[0.11]
Terms of Trade * mean(u-gap neg) -6.558***
[1.10]
Observations 1,965 1,965 1,029 1,029
R-squared 0.008 0.029 0.014 0.079
Number of countryno 85 85 37 37
The table reports the results from running the following regressions
yit = αi + β0nfayit (1 + β1yt) + γ0totit (1 + γ1yt) + it (1)
where yit is a measure of domestic activity relative to potential (the output gap or the negative
of unemployment or the unemployment gap); yt is its global average, nfayit is the ratio of
net foreign assets to GDP and totit is the terms of trade (with a depreciation defined as an
increase). The sample period is 1980-2011, the frequency is yearly. Unemployment or the
unemployment gap are from the IMF WEO database; the net foreign asset positions used to
calculate nfayit, the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP, are from the database by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007)); totit, the terms of trade, is taken from the Penn World Tables version
9.0.
used in our analysis. Section 3 analyses the stagnation and full employment steady states,
both under financial autarky and with intertemporal trade in non-contingent bonds. Section
4 studies how a small open economy can escape from global secular stagnation. Sections 5
and 6 discusses, respectively, alternative monetary policy measures and asset supply policies.
Section 7 concludes.
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2 The model
We consider a model of a small open economy under perfect foresight, integrated with the rest
of the world (ROW) on both goods and asset markets. The framework is one of overlapping
generations (OLG), as in Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) and Eggertsson et al. (2015).
Each country specializes in the production of one good, but consumes both goods. With
home bias in demand, this leads to fluctuations in the terms of trade and the real exchange
rate. Furthermore, international asset markets are incomplete, and we assume that each
country saves in terms of a CPI-indexed, real bond. In each country, households live for three
periods: young, middle-aged, and old. All the income accrues to the middle aged, such that
the young borrow to be able to consume subject to a borrowing constraint, whereas the old
consume their savings from last period. Labour supply is exogenous, and wages are assumed
downwardly sticky.
2.1 Households
Domestic households maximize
max
{Cyt ,Cmt+1,Cot+2}
{
(Cyt )
1−ρ
1− ρ + β
(Cmt+1)
1−ρ
1− ρ + β
2 (C
o
t+2)
1−ρ
1− ρ
}
subject to
Cyt = −Byt
Cmt+1 = PH,t+1/Pt+1Yt+1 + (1 + rt)B
y
t −Bmt+1
Cot+2 = (1 + rt+1)B
m
t+1
−(1 + rt)Byt ≤ Dt.
Here, Pt is the consumer price index (CPI—the price of domestic consumption), PH,t is the
producer price index (PPI—the price of domestic output), rt is the (domestic consumption-
based) real interest rate, and Dt is the borrowing constraint faced by the young. Furthermore,
Cit , i ∈ {y,m, o}, represent consumption by the young, middle-aged, and old, respectively, and
Bit, i ∈ {y,m} are bond holdings/savings by the young and middle-aged, respectively. Finally,
0 < β < 1 denotes the time-preference rate, and ρ−1 > 0 denotes the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution.
We consider an equilibrium in which the young borrow all the way up their borrowing con-
straint
Cyt = −Byt =
Dt
1 + rt
.
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Note that there are no prices appearing in the borrowing constraint, as the borrowing limit
is defined in real terms (as is the bond). The middle-aged satisfy an Euler equation
(Cmt )
−ρ = β(1 + rt)(Cot+1)
−ρ
while the old consume all their savings from last period
Cot = (1 + rt−1)B
m
t−1.
By combing these equations, we obtain that
Cmt =
(
1− 1
1 + [β(1 + rt)1−ρ]−
1
ρ
)[
PH,t
Pt
Yt −Dt−1
]
Bmt =
1
1 + [β(1 + rt)1−ρ]−
1
ρ
[
PH,t
Pt
Yt −Dt−1
]
for the middle-ages as well as
Cot = (1 + rt−1)
(
1
1 + [β(1 + rt−1)1−ρ]−
1
ρ
)[
PH,t−1
Pt−1
Yt−1 −Dt−2
]
for the old in equilibrium.
2.2 Goods market integration
We assume the domestic consumption basket is made up of domestically-produced and ROW-
produced goods as follows
Cit =
[
(1− ω) 1σ (CiH,t)
σ−1
σ + ω
1
σ (CiF,t)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
, i ∈ {y,m, o},
where CH,t is demand for the domestically-produced, CF,t demand for the ROW-produced
good, and where 0 ≤ 1 − ω ≤ 1 is the degree of home-bias in consumption and σ > 0 the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution. Expenditure minimization interlinks consumer and
producer price indexes as
Pt = [(1− ω)(PH,t)1−σ + ω(PF,t)1−σ]
1
1−σ , (2)
where PF,t is the price of the ROW-produced good (expressed in terms of domestic currency).
If we assume the law of one price holds at the level of each good
PH,t = EtP ∗H,t PF,t = EtP ∗F,t,
where Et is the nominal exchange rate (the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic
currency) and where an asterisk indicates variables in the ROW (here: the price of the
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domestic and the ROW-produced good, expressed in terms of foreign currency), then the
domestic terms of trade (the price of imports in terms of exports) are given by
St =
PF,t
PH,t
, (3)
and the real exchange rate (the price of ROW-consumption in terms of domestic consumption)
obtains from
Qt =
EtP ∗t
Pt
. (4)
2.3 Asset market integration
We assume that domestic and foreign households can, in addition to their saving in CPI-
denoted bonds, also save in non-indexed bonds which pay in terms of domestic and foreign
currency, respectively. All these bonds are in zero net supply, such that we may ignore them
in the household problem above. However, as a result, the following no-arbitrage conditions
have to be satisfied in equilibrium
(1 + r∗t ) = (1 + i
∗
t )
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
(5)
(1 + rt) = (1 + it)
Pt
Pt+1
(6)
(1 + it) = (1 + i
∗
t )
Et+1
Et (7)
where it (i
∗
t ) is the domestic (foreign) nominal interest rate. The first two equations are the
Fisher equations in the domestic and foreign country, respectively, while the last equation is
an interest parity condition.
2.4 Firms
Output is produced using labour from residents of the respective country, according to
Yt = L
α
t ,
where 0 < α ≤ 1. Optimality requires Wt = PH,tαLα−1t . Moreover, we adopt the specification
in Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) and assume that nominal wages are downwardly sticky of
degree 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1:
Wt = max{W˜t,W flext },
where W flext ≡ PH,tα(Lf )α−1 (here, Lf > 0 denotes full employment), and where W˜t is a
wage norm which solves
W˜t = γWt−1 + (1− γ)W flext .
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Using the above, Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) derive a Phillips curve of the form
Yt =
γ Y α−1αt−1
ΠH,t
+ (1− γ)(Y f )α−1α
 αα−1 (8)
whenever ΠH,t (:= PH,t/PH,t−1) < (Y f/Yt−1)
1−α
α , and
Yt = Y
f (9)
else, where Y f = (Lf )α is output under full employment. Note that the Phillips curve is a
function of current, not expected inflation.
2.5 Market clearing
Because the domestic economy is small, the CPI in ROW will correspond to the price of
foreign output, P ∗t = P ∗F,t, from which follows
Qt =
P ∗t Et
Pt
=
PF,t
Pt
= St
PH,t
Pt
. (10)
Domestic goods market clearing is then given by
Yt = (1− ω)
(
PH,t
Pt
)σ
Ct + ωS
σ
t Y
∗
t , (11)
where Ct := C
y
t + C
m
t + C
o
t denotes aggregate domestic consumption. Furthermore, asset
market clearing requires
NFAt = B
y
t +B
m
t = −
Dt
1 + rt
+
1
1 + [β(1 + rt)1−ρ]−
1
ρ
[
PH,t
Pt
Yt −Dt−1
]
, (12)
where NFAt is the domestic country’s net foreign asset position, which from the households’
budget constraint implies
Ct +NFAt = (1 + rt−1)NFAt−1 +
PH,t
Pt
Yt, (13)
the flow budget of the domestic country.
2.6 Monetary policy
We posit that the monetary authorities target inflation subject to a zero-bound constraint on
nominal rates:
ΠH,t = Π¯ subject to it ≥ 0, (14)
If inflation falls below target, nominal rates fall to zero:
it = 0 if ΠH,t < Π¯. (15)
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We assume that policymakers cannot commit and follow a standard interest rate rule. So,
once the economy is in a stagnation steady state and policy rates are at the zero lower
bound, nominal interest rates are inelastic to current as well as target inflation: a change in
the inflation target per se does not affect agents expectations about the current and future
monetary stance.
Alternatively, we consider regimes in which the monetary authorities can credibly pursue
exchange rate targets in the form crawling pegs
Et = E¯t, (16)
at some (time-varying) pre-announced rate E¯t.
To be clear, we should stress that, in the model, credible exchange rate policies cannot be
conceptually separated from credible policies targeting inflation, as one imply the other at
the corresponding equilibrium rates.
2.7 Rest of the world
In specifying the ROW, we model enough symmetry with the small open economy such that,
under financial autarky, the two economies will have the same real interest rate in steady
state. Specifically, we assume that
Assumption 1. The two economies have the same parameters: the same degree of risk aver-
sion, time preference, inflation target, curvature of the production function, full-employment
(per capita) output, degree of downward stickiness. Moreover, we let D∗t = Dt for all t.
As a result, even when both economies are financially integrated, in a symmetric steady state
there will be no current account imbalances. As we will see below, current account imbalances
can arise along the equilibrium path that allows a small open economy to escape stagnation.
Since the domestic economy is small, the rest of the world effectively is a closed economy.
We will assume that ROW will remain in steady state throughout: all shocks accrue in the
domestic economy. As in Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014), ROW finds itself in a steady state
of stagnation if D∗, the borrowing limit imposed on the young, is sufficiently tight. Inflation
and output (Π∗, Y ∗) then jointly solve
D∗Π∗ =
(
1
1 + [β(Π∗)−(1−ρ)]−
1
ρ
)
[Y ∗ −D∗]
as well as
Y ∗ = (Y f )∗
(
1− γ∗/Π∗
1− γ∗
) α
1−α
,
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where we have used the fact that i∗ = 0 such that (1 + r∗) = (Π∗)−1 from the Fisher equation
(5). It is easy to show that, in this steady state, both Π∗ < 1 and Y ∗ < (Y f )∗, hence
(1 + r∗) = (Π∗)−1 > 1, (17)
even though the natural real interest rate in this economy is negative.3 Thus, the output gap
and deflation are a reflection of the fact that real interest rates are above their natural, or
“equilibrium” level. As emphasized by Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014), this steady state is
unique to the extent that policy makers are unwilling to raise the inflation target above the
negative of the natural real interest rate. For instance, if the inflation target is zero percent,
a negative natural real interest rate is sufficient for ROW to be trapped in stagnation. As we
are concerned with policy options in a depressed world economy, we shall assume that ROW
finds itself in such a steady state for the remainder of the paper.
2.8 Equilibrium definition in the small open economy
Given initial conditions {Y−1, NFA−1, P ∗−1, P−1, PH,−1} and for given variables in the rest of
the world {D∗, r∗, Y ∗,Π∗, P ∗t = Π∗P ∗t−1, i∗ = 0}, an equilibrium in the domestic economy is a
set of sequences {Ct, Yt, Qt, St, PH,t, PF,t, Pt,ΠH,t,Πt, Et, it, rt, NFAt, Dt} that solve equations
(2)-(3),(6)-(13), equations ΠH,t ≡ PH,t/PH,t−1 and Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1, equation Dt = D∗, and
either policy rule (14)-(15) or policy rule (16).
3The natural or “equilibrium” real interest rate, that is, the real interest that would prevail absent nominal
rigidities, is implicitly defined by
D∗
1 + (rnat)∗
=
(
1
1 + [β(1 + (rnat)∗)1−ρ]
− 1
ρ
)[
(Y f )∗ −D∗
]
.
Note that (rnat)
∗ < 0 for sufficiently small D∗, which is the assumption made in the main text.
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3 Macroeconomic equilibrium in the small open economy
In this section, we explore how a small open economy can cope with the fact that its trading
partners are permanently trapped in stagnation—accompanied by deflation, zero nominal
interest rates, employment below potential, and a negative output gap. Most importantly, we
ask whether it can not be in stagnation in such a situation. We start with a characterization
of steady states, before we move on to dynamics and a discussion of the various policy regimes
further below.
3.1 Symmetric secular stagnation under financial autarky
To fix ideas, suppose ω = 0, implying that the two economies are completely closed—no
reasons to trade goods and assets. By assumption, the two countries have symmetric features
as regards frictions and potential output, as well as policy parameters (e.g. inflation target). If
the ROW is in a secular stagnation, the domestic economy would also find itself, necessarily, in
a stagnation steady state. Formally, with complete home-bias (ω = 0), we will have Pt = PH,t
from (2), Yt = Ct from (11) and NFAt = 0 from (13). The domestic steady state then solves
D
1 + r
=
(
1
1 + [β(1 + r)1−ρ]−
1
ρ
)
[Y −D] (18)
from (12), as well as
Y = Y f
(
1− γ/Π
1− γ
) α
1−α
, (19)
from (8). These are the same equations as in the rest of the world (Section 2.7), once we
replace (1 + r) by Fisher equation (6)
(1 + i) = (1 + r)Π. (20)
Precisely, if the domestic inflation target is the same as the one in ROW, then the solu-
tion is unique and characterized by i = 0 along with Y = Y ∗ < Y f ,Π = Π∗ < 1, and
(1 + r) = (1 + r∗) = (Π∗)−1 > 1. Thus, the domestic economy finds itself in the same state
of stagnation as the rest of the world.
Remarkably, the above is true also when ω > 0 but the economy is in financial autarky,
that is, the small open economy trades goods but its capital markets remain closed, implying
that its net foreign asset position must equal zero at all times (NFAt = 0 implying balanced
trade). In financial autarky, the equation (7) is not part of equilibrium, and the domestic
real rate is not pinned down by cross-border arbitrage. Yet, the two economies face the same
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stringent conditions in the domestic credit market, creating excess saving. We summarise this
result in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under financial autarky, provided that the inflation target is sufficiently
low, the domestic-economy steady state is unique. Similar to the case of complete autarky,
the economy is characterized by a negative output gap, deflation and nominal interest rates
constrained at their zero lower bound. Purchasing power parity holds: Q = S = 1.
Proof. See the appendix.
3.2 Asymmetric full-employment with international borrowing and lending
When the domestic economy opens up trade in both goods and assets, the stagnation steady
state is still a possibility, but a second steady state emerges, characterized by full employment,
inflation on target, and a strictly positive nominal interest rate.
Proposition 2. If ω > 0, the domestic economy can find itself in one of two steady states.
The stagnation steady state is the same as if the domestic economy were in autarky, and is
characterized by purchasing power parity Q = S = 1 and zero net foreign assets NFA = 0.
Conversely, the full employment steady state has Y = Y f , Π = Π¯, and (1 + i) = Π¯/Π∗ > 1.
Provided σ > 0 is large enough, this steady state is associated with a depreciated real exchange
rate and terms of trade, Q > 1 and S > 1, and a positive stock of net foreign assets NFA > 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 2 illustrates that a small open economy can find itself in a full employment
steady state even if the rest of the world is not, and can achieve this without modifying its
domestic inflation target.4 Intuitively, it can “export the problem”, in that it can achieve full
employment by weakening its exchange rate. For a high enough trade elasticity, this means
that the country exports its excess saving by building up net foreign assets.
To appreciate the role of nominal exchange rate flexibility, note that from UIP condition (7)
Et+1
Et = (1 + i) = Π¯/Π
∗ > 1, (21)
In this steady state, the nominal exchange rate constantly depreciates at a speed that is
determined by the ratio of the domestic inflation target and the negative inflationary drift
abroad (see also Corsetti et al. 2016). It follows that
4As in EMSS, under the conditions stated in the proposition, both steady states are (locally) determinate.
If by contrast σ is very low, approximately below (1− ω)/(2− ω), both steady states are explosive.
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Corollary 1. The full employment steady state is feasible only if the nominal exchange rate
is allowed to constantly depreciate. If domestic monetary policy pursues a fixed exchange rate,
only the stagnation steady state exists.
Proposition 1 establishes that monopoly power over the country’s terms of trade is not enough
for the small domestic economy to escape stagnation. In financial autarky, real depreciation
cannot lift the economy out of a secular stagnation equilibrium. In light of Proposition 2, we
conclude that asset trade is the crucial feature for the full-employment steady state to exist.
Net foreign assets must adjust consistent with full employment output and incomes.
To dig deeper into the adjustment mechanism, note first that if asset trade is allowed for,
real interest rates in the domestic economy are pinned down by their ROW counterpart up
to (expected) changes in the real exchange rate
(1 + rt) = (1 + r
∗
t )
Qt+1
Qt
, (22)
where we have combined equations (4) and (6)-(7). In steady state, the real exchange rate
must be constant such that (1 + r) = (1 + r∗). As a result, from the perspective of the small
domestic economy, the domestic real interest rate is exogenous in steady state and therefore
the same in both the employment and stagnation steady state. Furthermore, equilibrium in
the asset market is characterized by equation (12)
Bmt = −Byt +NFAt,
such that domestic savings (by the middle-aged) equal domestic borrowing (by the young)
plus the net foreign asset position. Intuitively, recall that the stagnation steady state re-
sults from “excess savings”, and that the real interest rate remains “stuck” above its market
clearing level, in turn generating the negative output gap. By contrast, as established by our
Proposition 2, a small open economy can take such excess savings abroad by acquiring assets
on foreigners. The proposition makes it clear that, for this to be possible, the trade elasticity
must be large enough, and the capital account must be open and in deficit, as the flip-side
of current account surpluses. This takes pressure off the domestic real interest rate, creating
the conditions for an equilibrium under full employment to emerge.
3.3 Exporting versus devaluing domestic savings: the possibility of beggar-
thyself depreciation
From theory, we know that real exchange rate movements have both substitution and income
effects. Real depreciation makes domestically produced goods cheaper, redirecting world
demand towards them. For given output, however, it also reduces the international value
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of domestic production, making domestic residents poorer. With incomplete markets, these
income effects tend to be strong, and can become stronger than the substitution effects (see
Corsetti et al. (2008b) and Corsetti et al. (2008a)).
Consider a trade elasticity just below (but not far from) the following threshold: σ˜ = 1/(2−ω),
a number in between one half and one.5 A steady state equilibrium with full employment
exists, associated with real depreciation. But the rate of depreciation is so large that, valued
at international prices, the national income when the economy moves from secular stagnation
to full-employment output actually falls. The contraction in income in turn reduces the value
of domestic savings, causing the country to become an international debtor in equilibrium.
As a result of the adverse terms-of-trade movements, domestic residents work more, bringing
the economy to full employment, and cut consumption.
The main lesson is apparent. For a range of low trade elasticities, a country can still escape
secular stagnation via depreciation, but the income effects of a “currency war” always prevails
over substitution effects: desired savings fall more than the change in the foreign demand for
domestic output. With international prices moving against the country, domestic residents
need to work more to sustain any given level of consumption, creating a trade-off by which the
full-employment steady state may not be welfare improving. A currency war is then beggar
thyself.
3.4 A graphical synthesis
Figure 1 summarizes the previous discussion graphically, depicting equilibrium in the domestic
asset market for both the case of a high trade elasticity (left side) and a low trade elasticity
(right side). In either case, the upper panel plots domestic savings (by the middle-aged,
= Bm) versus domestic borrowing (by the young, = −By) against the domestic real interest
rate r. By contrast, the lower panel plots both savings and borrowing against the domestic
level of production, Y .6 Remember that both savings and borrowing are denoted in real
terms, or more precisely, in terms of domestic consumption.
When the trade elasticity is high, under full employment, domestic savings (Bm,full) exceed
domestic borrowing at the prevailing world real interest rate r∗. If capital outflows are
possible, the difference is made up by a positive net foreign asset position. If, however, such
outflows are not possible, the excess savings must be “absorbed” by the domestic economy.
Given that r = r∗ and that hence the level of domestic borrowing is fixed (namely, equal to
D/(1 + r∗)), this requires a reduction in the level of desired savings.
5See the Appendix for a derivation and discussion.
6We assume in the graph that savings are upward sloping in the real interest rate, which holds as long as
ρ > 1. We do, however, not require this assumption for any of our results.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of equilibrium in domestic asset market.
This brings us to the lower panel which shows that, again for a high level of the trade
elasticity, desired savings increase in the level of domestic production. This is because the
level of domestic income valued at international prices (equal to PHY/P , see equation (12))
is positively sloped in domestic production. Thus, a reduction in desired savings requires a
reduction in domestic production, and the economy moves from Y full to Y stag < Y full. The
latter shifts the savings curve to the left in the upper panel (Bm,stag), and equilibrium in the
domestic credit market is restored.
By contrast, when the trade elasticity is low, domestic income hence domestic savings fall in
the level of domestic production (the Bm curve in the lower right panel is backward bending).
This is because, when domestic and imported goods are highly complementary, a higher level
of domestic production is absorbed only when its price falls dramatically, such that, valued
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at international prices, the value of domestic income is actually reduced.7 As a result, as the
economy moves from stagnation to full employment, its excess savings are compressed in value
by so much, that under full employment the economy finds itself as a net debtor vis-a`-vis the
rest of the world: Bm,full moves to the left of Bm,stag in the upper right panel of Figure 1.
4 Transition to full employment - how do small open economies
escape stagnation?
We have established the existence of a full-employment steady state for the small domestic
economy. We now analyze how the domestic economy can escape stagnation by solving
explicitly for the transition path to full employment.
4.1 The escape path
Starting from deep recession, we show that, under the monetary policy rule (14), escape
requires a large upfront nominal and real depreciation, and a temporary rise in both nominal
and real interest rates relative to their previous steady states. In the process, the domestic
economy steadily recovers and, depending on the trade elasticity, either runs current account
surpluses or current account deficits. The transitions for either case are displayed in Figures
2 and 3 below.8
Observe that the nominal exchange rate depreciates upfront, and keeps depreciating more
gradually over time. This reflects Corollary 1: for the domestic economy to delink itself
from the deflationary drift in the ROW, domestic inflation needs to outpace foreign inflation,
implying trend depreciation. In anticipation of this, the nominal interest rate jumps up from
UIP condition (7), and comes down again gradually as the speed of nominal depreciation
subsides. In the long run, the nominal interest rate it is pinned down by Fisher equation
(6), and corresponds to real interest rate (1 + r∗) times the domestic inflation target. The
real interest rate and real exchange rate adjust similarly as their nominal counterparts in
the early stage of recovery. In the long run, however, the real interest rate settles down
on its pre-transition value, equation (22), while the real exchange rate remains permanently
weakened—reflecting the relative abundance of the domestic good on the world market under
7In terms of equations, PH/P falls as at a faster-than-linear rate as Y rises, such that domestic income
valued at international prices, PHY/P , falls as Y
stag increases to Y full.
8We emphasize that technically, equilibrium in the model is globally indeterminate, in that dynamics can
be affected by “sunspot shocks”. As in earlier models of inflation targeting under a zero lower bound constraint
(for example Benhabib et al. 2001), a change in beliefs can thus trigger transition to the full employment steady
state—as well as transition to the stagnation steady state. See Benhabib et al. (2002) for a discussion on how
transition to the zero lower bound steady state can be ruled out in a closed economy. See Cochrane (2011) for
a general discussion on such “ruling out an equilibrium path”. See Mertens and Ravn (2014) for “optimism”
versus “pessimism” affecting dynamics under global indeterminacy in a closed-economy New Keynesian model.
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Figure 2: Example transition to full employment: high trade elasticity.
domestic full employment. Meanwhile, the country builds up net foreign assets during the
recovery in the case of a high trade elasticity (Figure 2), and builds up net foreign debt during
the recovery in the case of a low trade elasticity (Figure 3). The lower middle panel echoes the
discussion from earlier above: domestic savings rise during the transition to full employment
when the trade elasticity is high, but fall when the trade elasticity is low.
The fact that the recovery in this economy is associated with a temporary rise in nominal
and real interest rates relative to their pre-transition steady states, is obviously at odds with
the notion that, in the presence of nominal and financial rigidities, a boost in demand and
depreciation requires a fall in interest rates. Here however the rise in nominal interest rates is
driven by trend depreciation in the new steady state, which is required to delink the long-run
price level in the domestic economy from the deflationary drift in the rest of the world—a
result that resonates with the ‘Neo-Fisherian’ literature.9 This dynamic adjustment is also
9See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) for an example of ‘Neo-Fisherianism’ in a small open economy model.
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Figure 3: Example transition to full employment: low trade elasticity.
reminiscent of Svensson’s “Foolproof Method” to escape a liquidity trap in an open economy:
what jump-starts the economy is an upfront and persistent weakening of the nominal and real
exchange rate (Svensson 2001 and Svensson 2003).
4.2 Valuation effects and macroeconomic dynamics along the escape path
A novel contribution of our paper is a close-up analysis of the dynamics of output and the
current account along the transition: Under the conditions spelled out in proposition 2 the
economic activity falls upfront; it only recovers gradually as the ROW absorbs the saving
surplus. Along this path, the interest rate must increase, to compress domestic demand
and facilitate net exports of the appropriate size (the opposite occurring with a low trade
elasticity).
The question we discuss in this subsection is how, along the transition, valuation effects
from depreciation may affects macroeconomic dynamics and adjustment. We have already
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seen that, when trade elasticities are low, the large real depreciation in steady state reduces
the present discounted value of income flows from domestic production, i.e. causes a fall
in domestic wealth. The implications for macroeconomic dynamics are apparent from a
comparison of Figures 2 and 3. First, the rate of depreciation will be higher (reflecting lower
elasticities). Second, consumption will fall on impact, driven by lower domestic wealth, and
will indeed keep falling to its new, lower, steady state level. Third, the country will run a
deficit, becoming an international borrower.10
Which elasticity is relevant for the analysis of small open economies? As is well known, there
is little consensus in the literature. By and large, macro time-series estimates tend to yield
values on the low side, ranging from as low as .3 to 2. Micro and trade estimates tend to yield
much higher values, in the range of 2 to 4 or even higher.11 There is nonetheless consensus
that trade elasticities are lower in the short run than in the long run, prompting several
studies to investigate the reasons for this difference (Ruhl (2008), Crucini and Davis (2016)).
In light of the debate in the literature, it is not appropriate to rule out the possibility of
low elasticities a priori. Yet, the empirical and quantitative evidence makes a strong case
for reconsidering our results letting elasticities differ in the short and the long run, becoming
higher over a longer time horizon.
In Figure 4, the elasticity is .46 at the beginning of the escape path, and increases gradually
to 4 as a function of time. A number of important results emerge. The exchange rate
needs to adjust in nominal and real terms much more at the beginning of the transition,
so does inflation. The real exchange rate actually overshoots temporarily its value over the
transition, driving down the real interest rate. Domestic borrowing temporarily rises together
with saving. Most remarkably, the nominal interest rate so remains at the zero lower bound
for a number of periods.
A key lesson from allowing for plausible differences in short- and long-run elasticities is that
along the escape route, the interest rate in a small open economy may remain at the ELB
on impact. It may take some time before the improvement in macroeconomic conditions and
persistent inflation allows the central bank to return to business as usual. During that period,
the economy experiences some exchange rate appreciation, after the initial overshooting.
To be clear: the escape path is still Neo-Fisherian at heart. But strong valuation effects in
10As mentioned in the last section of this paper, valuation effects may be so large that the full employment
steady state is explosive, and a transition path does not exists under rational expectations.The elasticity is
selected to be the smallest for which the steady state is not explosive.
11As regards macro studies, Taylor (1993) estimates the value for the U.S. to be 0.39, while Whalley (1984)
reports a value of 1.5. For European countries most empirical studies suggest a value below 1. For instance,
Anderton et al. (2004) report values between 0.5 and 0.81 for the Euro area. See the comprehensive study on
G-7 countries by Hooper, Johnson and Marquez, 2000. As regards micro studies, for instance, Bernard et al.
(2003) finds a value as high as 4.
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Figure 4: Transition to full employment: low short-run, high long-run trade elasticity.
the short run create a rich and complex dynamic, that may appear (but is not) at odds with
the Neo-Fisherian prescription for an increase in the nominal rates driven by high expected
inflation.
5 Adjusting monetary rules
A key result of the secular stagnation literature is that a permanent slump results from real
interest rates being “too high” world-wide in steady state, depressing demand and generating
negative output gaps. From a different perspective, at the equilibrium real rates, domestic
savings cannot be absorbed at full employment, given that there are insufficient savings
vehicles in the domestic economy.
In a closed economy context, the above is an argument for either lowering the effective lower
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bound constraint, i.e. set negative policy rates, or increasing the target inflation, in an
attempt to enhance the ability of monetary policy to stimulate demand. In this section, we
discuss both measures in turn.
5.1 Reducing the effective lower bound (ELB)...
When the ELB is lowered to negative territory, (14) and (15) change to
ΠH,t = Π¯ subject to it ≥ −i¯ZLB,
or alternatively
it = −i¯ZLB if ΠH,t < Π¯.
Here, i¯ZLB > 0 denotes the degree of effective relaxation of the zero lower bound constraint.
5.1.1 ...makes secular stagnation worse...
An important result is that resetting the ELB worsens economic stagnation. From the Fisher
equations (5)-(6) we have that
Π =
1− i¯ZLB
1 + r∗
= (1− i¯ZLB)Π∗ < Π∗, (23)
where we again have used that (1 + r) = (1 + r∗) in steady state. That is, as i¯ZLB > 0 and
the economy is in the stagnation steady state, the economy must experience deflation for the
Fisher equations (both domestically and abroad) to be satisfied. In turn, from Phillips curve
(8), a greater rate of deflation domestically widens the domestic output gap
Y f
(
1− γ/Π
1− γ
) α
1−α
< Y f
(
1− γ/Π∗
1− γ
) α
1−α
,
such that as a result, Y < Y ∗ < Y f , and the domestic recession becomes more severe—in
fact, deeper than the recession in ROW.
The dynamics of the domestic economy in response to a ELB adjustment is illustrated by
Figure 5, which shows the transition to the new and worse steady state, with even deeper
stagnation. Observe that, with the reduction in nominal interest rates to negative values,
the nominal exchange rate sets on a path of permanent appreciation, again reflecting the
UIP condition (7).12 Output stagnates, and the real exchange rate appreciates, reflecting
12In the new steady state, the nominal exchange rate appreciates at the speed of the relative rate of deflation
in the two countries, which follows from UIP condition (7)
1− i¯ZLB = Et+1Et ,
combined with equations (17) and (23).
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Figure 5: Transition as effective zero lower bound is reduced. Parameters as in Figure 2.
the relative abundance of the ROW-produced good relative to the domestic good in the new
steady state. As output collapses, domestic savings are reduced, which leads to persistent
current account deficits and an accumulation of net foreign debt. Lastly, the real interest rate
temporarily falls in anticipation of an appreciation of the real exchange rate, as a result of
the UIP condition in real terms (22). Thus, somewhat paradoxically—and in line with our
discussion in Section 4—the real interest rate actually falls precisely as output collapses to a
permanently lower level.
It is worth stressing that a lower ELB implies that the real interest rates falls more upfront,
boosting domestic demand and generating a current account deficit. The country imports
more foreign saving.
As it turns out, the previous results again are driven by the fact that the domestic economy is
open and financially integrated with the rest of the world (recall our discussion from Section
6). To see this, turn back to the case of financial autarky as in Section 3.1. In this case the
domestic stagnation steady state is determined from to (18)-(20), and by setting i = −i¯ZLB.
As one can easily verify, in this case lowering the effective lower bound actually raises output,
and reduces deflationary pressure, thereby bringing the economy closer to the full-employment
equilibrium. Figure 6 exemplifies this result by repeating the experiment from Figure 5, but
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Figure 6: Transition as effective zero lower bound is reduced in (financially) closed economy
now assuming that the domestic economy is financially closed. The figure clearly shows that,
as a result of the rate cut, output recovers—albeit not to potential—along with a decline in
the domestic real interest rate.
As already explained, the divergence between closed and open economy crucially results from
the fact that, in the latter, domestic real interest rates are determined in the world capital
markets. In a closed economy, by manipulating the domestic nominal interest rate, it is
instead possible to affect the the domestic real interest rates in the long run. In an open,
financially integrated economy, by contrast, manipulating nominal rates necessarily translate
into deflationary adjustment in the long run, as a result of Fisher equation (6) combined with
real interest rate parity.
5.1.2 ...but may help along the transition
It is easy to see that the ELB is irrelevant along the escape transitional dynamics as long as,
along the path, the zero lower bound is never a binding constraint. So for sufficiently high
trade elasticities, tampering with the ELB is not useful.
Yet, we have established that, in the realistic case of a difference between short- and long-
run elasticities, nominal rates may remain constrained at the ELB in the initial phase of the
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recovery. Once the economy is on the escape path, a reduction in the ELB allows a faster
recovery, shortening the length of time in which monetary policy is constrained.
5.2 Raising the inflation target
To conclude our discussion of monetary policy measures, we shall discuss the implications of
permanently raising the domestic inflation target. As explained in Eggertsson and Mehrotra
(2014), for the closed economy this policy can be effective to the extent that the inflation
target is raised above the negative of the natural real interest rate of the economy. In this
case, the full employment steady state necessarily exists—and is characterized by inflation on
target, and a strictly positive nominal interest rate. However, the policy by itself does not
rule out the stagnation steady state, and is in this sense less effective as a tool for forward
guidance than in situations where the duration of the zero lower episode is necessarily finite
(Eggertsson and Woodford 2003).
In the context of our small open economy with integrated financial markets, the policy’s
benefits are even subtler. Precisely, from Section 3.2 we know that the full employment steady
state exists, even as the domestic inflation target would imply uniqueness of the stagnation
steady state both if the domestic economy were closed, or if it were operating under financial
autarky. The existence of both steady states is thus unaltered as the domestic inflation target
is changed. In particular, a more elevated target does not stimulate economic activity at the
zero lower bound, given that the duration of the ELB spell can in principle be infinite.
However, what is altered is the transition to the full employment steady state along the
recovery path in Section 4. The reason is that, along the path shown in Figure 2, domestic
policy makers hit their inflation target instantly as the zero lower bound ceases to bind in the
period of the lift-off. Thus with a higher inflation target, the recovery would be accompanied
by higher levels of inflation. But then, from Phillips curve (8), output recovers more quickly,
which in turn is a result of price inflation affecting nominal wage inflation favourably, which
in turn relaxes the downward constraint on nominal wages. By repeating the experiment from
Figure 2, but under an inflation target which has been raised slightly, we note that output
recovers more quickly, and at some point jumps to potential straight away, period where the
wage constraint ceases to bind altogether.13
13This occurs when ΠH,t > (Y
f/Yt−1)
1−α
α , recall equations (8) and (9).
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6 Financial policy and the size of the external imbalance
In this section, we elaborate on the idea that the size or even the sign of the current account
is sensitive to asset-supply policy. In what follows, we will show that, under the appropriate
policies, the transition to full employment does not necessarily require the country to run
external surpluses.
Consider policies which could increase domestic asset supply. Specifically, consider the effect
of loosening domestic credit conditions by increasing the amount of lending to the young:
a larger D > D∗. As established in Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014), in a closed economy
context this policy raises the natural real interest rate by increasing borrowing by the young,
while at the same time reducing saving by the middle-aged.14 As a result, the output gap
narrows in the stagnation steady state, and the rate of deflation is similarly reduced, such
that the policy has an overall favourable effect on the economy.
In an open economy context, the same policy has no effect in steady state: precisely, the
policy is neutral in terms of real rates and, under the EMSS specification (with inelastic labor
supply), aggregate output. However, it does affect the level of the real exchange rate and
the country’s net foreign asset position. Precisely, foreigners end up raising their holdings of
domestic assets, while the real exchange rate appreciates.
More formally, in steady state, the domestic real interest rate is nailed down by the real
interest rate in the ROW, from equation (22). Similarly, the rates of deflation in the two
countries must by synchronized from the two Fisher equations (6)-(5)
Π =
1
1 + r
=
1
1 + r∗
= Π∗,
where we have used that nominal rates are zero in both economies. As a result, from Phillips
curve (8), output gaps in the two countries are aligned in steady state, too. From the credit
market equilibrium (12), we observe that changes in By and Bm, as a result of changes in
D, must then be reflected in changes in the country’s net foreign asset position.15 Figure
7 shows this diagrammatically. We note that, in the new steady state once the policy has
been applied, desired borrowing exceeds domestic savings. The gap must be filled by capital
inflows and, as a result, current account deficits.
Nonetheless, there are at least two properties of such policy worth stressing. First, even
14The latter follows from the fact that, if the household accumulates greater debts while young, she has
fewer assets to save from when middle-aged.
15Again, the divergence between closed and open economy thus results from the fact that in the former,
the domestic and ROW real interest rates can differ, because equation (22) is not an equilibrium condition in
this case. As a result, domestic macro-prudential policies can push domestic real interest rates in a favourable
direction. By way of contrast, this is impossible in an open economy where domestic real interest rates are
determined on world capital markets.
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Figure 7: Graphical representation of domestic asset market as D is permanently reduced.
Case of high trade elasticity only.
when neutral in an aggregate sense, an increase in assets has distributional effects: it affects
relative consumption across generations. From a domestic vantage point, the policy may be
worth pursuing for distributional reasons, e.g., to attenuate the costs (of the transition) for
the young. Second, by containing eternal surpluses and moderating real depreciation, raising
the supply of domestic assets reduces the cross-border negative spillovers from the escape
from stagnation. The country does not dump its excess saving in the international markets,
so it does not exacerbate the secular stagnation problem at global level. While spillovers from
unilateral initiatives of individual small open economies are small, they become relevant if
many countries follow the same route. Asset-supply policies thus appear to be a key item in
the agenda for a coordinated policy response to secular stagnation.
27
7 Conclusion
The global decline in equilibrium real interest rates and sub-par economic growth has re-
newed interest in the hypothesis of ‘secular stagnation’. A small open economy exposed to
a world which is permanently depressed—negative output gap, less-than-full employment,
and nominal interest rates close to their zero bound constraint—faces challenges going be-
yond conventional prescriptions for optimal policy. This paper establishes this formally in an
OLG framework a`-la Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014). We expand on the existing results by
investigating new policy experiments in a small open economy framework. The underlying
message of the paper is that a small open economy can escape stagnation if financial markets
are sufficiently integrated, such that international capital flows are possible. The key feature
of capital flows in our model is that, with plausible trade elasticities, surplus countries attain
full employment by using other countries’ liabilities as savings vehicles: the domestic country
can ‘export the problem’ and achieve full employment by weakening its exchange rate and
building up net foreign assets.
Our analysis bears key lessons for theory and policy. Most notably, it casts the ’neo-
mercantilist’ motives ascribed to some chronic current-account surplus countries in a new
light. In the literature, external surpluses are often thought to be beneficial for either supply-
side (Rodrik 2008, Benigno and Fornaro 2014) or precautionary motives. In a global secular
stagnation, in contrast, current account surpluses create the conditions for full employment
at home, by absorbing the desired saving by domestic residents without output and employ-
ment adjustment. Countries may attain full employment by using other countries’ liabilities
as savings vehicles. In this sense, neo-mercantilism has an ‘old Keynesian’ rationale. More-
over, in economies with a low trade elasticity, or when the government pursues asset-supply
policies, the escape actually takes place together with a contraction in domestic excess saving
associated with current account deficits. Despite the accumulation of external debt along
the transition path, also in this case nominal and real interest rates need to rise above their
previous steady-state values.
Indeed, at the core of the escape from stagnation, is not the mere opportunity for a small
open economy to dump its excess saving in the international financial market (or more in
general to generate external imbalances taking advantages of foreign demand). Rather, the
adjustment mechanism ultimately rests on preventing a steady drop in the rate of domestic
inflation driven by the global deflationary drift. This is the core domestic and Neo-Fisherian
dimension of the adjustment, which in an open economy requires permanent nominal exchange
rate depreciation. In this context, with the real interest rate fixed at world level, attempting
to lower the effective zero-bound on nominal domestic rates is generally counterproductive.
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At the same time, both along the transition and in steady state, the real exchange rate must
be sufficiently depreciated to ensure that domestic income and desired savings, as well as
external demand, are consistent with convergence to full employment in the long run. This
is the external dimension of the adjustment.
These two dimensions interact significantly because real depreciation produces both substi-
tution and income effects, the latter including output valuation effects that may be quite
strong—especially when short run trade elasticities are realistically low.
A point that we have not pursued in our analysis is that real depreciation may end up
exacerbating domestic financial frictions. In our model, we can shed light on this issue via a
small amendment to the baseline specification, that is, by having the borrowing limit faced
by the young generation specified in output units, rather than consumption units. Under this
specification, real depreciation makes the constraint more stringent—intuitively, the collateral
against which the young can borrow becomes less valuable at international prices. Thus,
real depreciation produces a contraction in domestic borrowing, with at least two notable
consequences. First, relative to our baseline, welfare from the escape is lower. Second, the fall
in domestic borrowing translates into larger capital outflows, as the young absorb less saving
by the middle-aged.16 If real depreciation exacerbates domestic frictions, escape without the
accumulation of external surpluses becomes even less likely than predicted by our baseline
model, and the possibility of beggar-thy-self depreciation is similarly raised.
While we analyze income effects of depreciation calling attention to trade elasticities, we are
fully aware that there are many other possible features of the economy that may reinforce
them. A particularly important one is the composition of a country’s gross assets and liabili-
ties, going beyond the value of labor endowment/human capital (as we have in our model), to
include physical capital and external assets and liabilities. If the small open economy has an
initial stock of foreign wealth denominated in the foreign currency, real depreciation along the
escape path will create valuation effects that could be adverse (if foreign wealth is negative,
i.e. debt) or positive (if foreign wealth is positive, e.g. international reserves), but in all cases
will influence consumption and welfare along the escape path and possibly in steady state.
The aggregate dynamics and distributional effects across generations will in turn depend on
who owns these assets (public vs private), and intergenerational government policy. We leave
to future work an exploration of these intriguing directions of research.
16In terms of Figure 1, the −By line would shift to the left as the economy moves from stagnation to full
employment.
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